Standing Committee D

[Mr. Bill O'Brien in the Chair]

Courts Bill [Lords]

Clause 58 - Inspectors of court administration etc.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 28, in
clause 58, page 27, line 18, at end insert 
 ', subject to the requirement that the total cost to the taxpayer of the entire inspectorate shall never exceed £2.4 million.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 66, in 
clause 59, page 27, line 36, after 'services', insert 'including information technology services,'.
 Amendment No. 67, in 
clause 59, page 28, line 8, after 'court', insert 
 ', save the High Court,'.
 Amendment No. 68, in 
clause 60, page 28, line 21, at end insert 
 'which shall highlight best practice and catalogue inefficiences.'.

Nick Hawkins: I welcome you back to the Chair, Mr. O'Brien, as I welcome members of the Committee back to our proceedings after a short break. Amendment No. 28 would be an important cost control measure. Even if it does not find favour with the Minister, it might do with Treasury mandarins, but I shall wait to hear what the hon. Gentleman says about that. The reason why we want a requirement that the total cost to the taxpayer of the new inspectorate should not exceed £2.4 million is to concentrate minds. Conservative Members are always worried about the growth of new bureaucracies that take on a life of their own and cost the British taxpayer increasing amounts.
 We want the Bill to state that the total cost would not be allowed to exceed that figure, which relates to the compliance cost assessment that the Government have produced. Before extra recruitments were made to the new inspectorate, or expansion was planned, there would have to be savings to compensate for that expansion. Our argument can be shortly stated: we consider that a cap on expenditure is worth while not only at the outset but for the future, so that the new apparatus does not mushroom out of all proportion to its value. 
 Amendments Nos. 66, 67 and 68 would have a slightly different effect. Although amendment No. 66 relates to clause 59, it is appropriate to consider it now. It is important that the inspectorate can report on IT services, which will constitute an important part of its work. The IT projects associated with our courts and our legal system have an unhappy history. I do not want to embarrass the Government any more than 
 they are already embarrassed about their IT problems, but it is especially important to ensure that it is part of the duty of the inspectors to report on IT. 
 As for amendment No. 67 to clause 59, we have suggested that there should be an exception to subsection (3)(a), so that the Lord Chancellor could not add the High Court to the list. That is an important separate category and it would be inappropriate for it to be subject to the powers of the Lord Chancellor under the clause—although it is perfectly acceptable for subsection (2)(a), (b) and (c) to cover the Crown court, the county courts and the magistrates courts. I am always worried about giving further powers to the Lord Chancellor or his successor in title. It would open things up far too much, and the Bill ought to be clear about the Lord Chancellor's powers. 
 I hope that the Government will accept amendment No. 68. It applies to clause 60, but it is appropriately grouped here with the others. If they cannot accept its wording, I hope that a Government amendment will be tabled to a similar effect. It should be clearly stated in the Bill that the annual report, when it is produced, should highlight not only best practice but the inefficiencies that are found when the inspectorate makes its inspection. Those inefficiencies should be catalogued. The amendment would be a helpful additional clarification of the functions of the chief inspector and the contents of his annual report. 
 It is all too easy to have annual reports that only tell the good side and do not identify the flaws. Too often in Parliament an august body such as the Public Accounts Committee has had to undertake a separate investigation to find the inefficiencies in an organisation. If it were clearly written in the Bill that the annual report shall not merely be a report to the Lord Chancellor that those of us in Parliament who are scrutinising the work of the new inspectorate can read, but will have to identify best practice and catalogue inefficiencies, that would be useful. Our amendments cover separate points, but the matters involved are important. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

Norman Lamb: I welcome you to the Chair this morning, Mr. O'Brien, and I will be brief. I share the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins) about amendment No. 28. Having a fixed maximum sum outlined in the Bill is not an appropriate way of dealing with the concern that has been expressed, but we are right to worry about such matters. Will the Minister confirm the current actual cost of the magistrates courts service inspectorate and say how it has grown during the past few years? I should be interested to know what sort of total cost we are talking about. Will payment be on the same basis as for the magistrates courts service inspectorate? Will it simply be an expansion of the current body into something covering the range of courts?
 As for amendment No. 66, it is right to highlight IT services, but I am not sure whether it is appropriate to specify them in the Bill. I should welcome an assurance from the Minister that IT seems to be in order in the sector. I cannot agree with the suggestion in 
 amendment No. 67 that the High Court be excluded, because it is sensible to extend the powers to all courts. 
 Finally, with regard to amendment No. 68, there is a real tendency for annual reports to be anodyne, and it seems sensible for the Bill to require the report to cover best practice and highlight the bad things as well as the good things, thereby cataloguing the inefficiencies. Even if he does not want an amendment to that effect, I should welcome the Minister's assurances that the report will contain something of substance, which will help guide the service and improve it in future.

Christopher Leslie: Good morning, Mr. O'Brien. This series of four amendments helps to give an overview of the fact that we are creating a new court inspectorate for a new unified courts administration. Specific questions have been asked, but it seems that in general, the Committee has broadly accepted the need to have a strong inspectorate principle overseeing an important aspect of public life.
 Amendment No. 28 would place a permanent cash limit—£2.4 million, I think—on the expenditure earmarked for the inspectorate. The long-term effect of that would be gradually to restrict the number of inspections that could be undertaken, which would restrict the work that inspectors could do. The Government feel that putting a cash bar on the budget of the new inspectorate would be inappropriate, and a bad approach to legislation. 
 I suspect that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath wanted to bring out issues relating to the total cost. He felt that there should be a cap or some downward pressure on the inspectorate. I am not as concerned as he is that somehow the inspectorate's expenditure will run amok and out of control. The magistrates courts services inspectorate does a good job for a fair sum of money, and we envisage it bringing largely the same processes and professionalism to the new unified courts administration as it has brought to its work as it is currently defined. 
 The hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) asked about the current budget. It is about £2 million. We envisage extending that to cover the other court services, which could cost about £400,000 extra per annum, but that is obviously not a fixed figure, and it could be more or less. It is not appropriate to have inspections determined on a cash-limited basis. Inspections are vital to auditing and cross-referencing to find out whether a court a service is doing a good job, and providing good value for money and an efficient and effective system. We should give all power to the inspectorate's elbow and make sure that it has the resources and the tools necessary to do a quality job. I would not want to see a legislative bar on its budget increased, not least because the Government need the capability to respond to the inspectorate's requests, and to any changes that are needed to ensure that it can do its job thoroughly. 
 Amendment No. 66 would impose a duty on the inspectors to inspect and report on the system and services that support the courts, and in particular on information technology services, which would be explicitly included in the Bill. The amendment is not necessary. Information technology and similar services are already implicitly part of the provisions, and I can confirm that the ''services'' provided for the courts include, among other things, scrutiny of information technology, security and catering. It is our intention that services such as IT should be subject to inspection, and that will be part of the inspectors' duties. There is no need for a statutory obligation singling that aspect out. 
 Amendment No. 67 would prevent the Lord Chancellor from extending the inspectorate's remit to include the High Court. When the hon. Member for Surrey Heath advocated the amendment, he said that he felt the current situation was inappropriate. He did not explain his logic or rationale, but suggested that he was suspicious that the unworthy influence of the Lord Chancellor was somehow creeping over the judiciary. I assure him that that is not the case. With the inspectorate, we want to make sure that all courts services provide an efficient and effective system. There is no justifiable reason to exclude the High Court in particular, not least because the amendment did not exclude the Court of Appeal. The hon. Gentleman is suggesting we remove one aspect of the court system but leave others in, but there is no reason to do that. 
 We want a unified court administration and a reflective system of inspection that can examine all aspects of court activity, track the passage of cases through the system, investigate where delays are occurring and report on that to Parliament.

Norman Lamb: I appreciate that there may be concerns in some quarters about the creeping influence of the Lord Chancellor. I recognise that clause 59(5) makes it clear that the inspectors cannot inspect the making of judicial decisions or the exercise of any judicial discretion.
 Perhaps the Minister could place on record the absolute importance of the separation of powers, so that it is clear that we are talking only about the administration of the courts, and the measure cannot impinge any further, on to judicial discretion.

Christopher Leslie: I do not often say this, but the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: he has hit the nail on the head. Clause 59(5) does indeed ensure that there will be no transgression into
''making judicial decisions, or . . . exercising any judicial discretion.''
 The measure is about the administration of the courts system, and there is no justifiable reason to exclude the High Court from the wider inspection regime. 
 Amendment No. 68 would explicitly include in the Bill the fact that the annual report from the chief inspector should 
''highlight best practice and catalogue inefficiences.''
 We do not need to include that. For a start, I believe that the inspectorate and the chief inspector can be 
 trusted to do a good job in respect of the nature and content of their annual report. Also, there will be an opportunity for the Lord Chancellor's officials in the Department for Constitutional Affairs to give guidance. As has been stated, we want both the good and the bad to be brought out in the annual report. 
 If the intention of the hon. Member for Surrey Heath in tabling the amendment was to seek a commitment that we would make sure that all aspects, not just the positive, could be touched on in an annual report, I certainly give him that assurance. I do not believe that mentioning that specific aspect of the editorial content of an annual report in the Bill would be right. That would be rather inflexible. I believe that guidance can deal adequately with the content of the annual report. On that basis, I must urge the Committee to reject all four of the hon. Gentleman's amendments, but I hope that they have at least given us the opportunity to touch on several aspects of the importance of the inspection process.

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful to the Minister for a number of things that he has said. It is helpful to have on record the fact that the annual report will highlight best practice and catalogue inefficiences, as we wanted it to. If the report started not to do that, people could refer back to what the Minister said today, which will be recorded in Hansard. Likewise, the Minister has given a firm and categorical assurance this morning about the inspectorate reporting on information technology services. The debate has been useful in getting those matters on the record.
 As the Minister will probably appreciate, I was not quite as impressed with what he said about the money side of things. He is clearly still leaving the door open for the inspectorate to grow too much, and for too much taxpayers' money to be spent on it. Nevertheless, we recognise that the inspectorate will be doing an important job. As the Minister rightly said, we wanted to probe the issue, and at least some of what the Minister said can be referred back to. I take his point about amendment No. 67. He says that we could have included all the other courts, too. We were using the High Court to probe the subject. We have had a useful debate, and I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 59 to 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64 - Power to alter judicial titles

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 69, in
clause 64, page 30, line 44, at end insert 
 'and have regard to their recommendations made as a consequence of that consultation.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 100, in 
clause 100, page 55, line 5, at end insert 
 'and have regard to his recommendations made as a consequence of that consultation.'.

Nick Hawkins: This point can be shortly stated. We wish to ensure that the Lord Chancellor has regard to the recommendations of the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Family Division and the Vice-Chancellor. That obligation should be clearly stated in the Bill. Amendment No. 100 would make the same provision for Northern Ireland. There is no good reason why the Lord Chancellor should not be obliged to have regard to the recommendations of the most senior figures in the judiciary under the Bill. I will listen with interest to the Minister's comments on that matter.

Christopher Leslie: As the hon. Gentleman has said, the amendment would expressly require the Lord Chancellor to ''have regard to . . . recommendations'' of the heads of division following consultation with them before exercising his order-making power to amend judicial titles in England and Wales. Amendment No. 100 deals with the Northern Ireland situation.
 I am advised that the amendment is unnecessary. As a matter of public law, there is an express statutory requirement to consult. It follows that the Lord Chancellor must already take the results of that consultation into account before making his decision—in this case, before making the relevant order. A number of judicial decisions have shown what is required where there is a requirement to consult, and they make it clear that the decision maker must take account of the results of the consultation. Otherwise, his or her decision may be open to challenge. 
 Hon. Members will clearly recall the comments of Lord Justice Simon Brown in the case of Regina v. Devon county council ex parte Baker in 1995. Drawing from earlier authorities, he described the request for consultation as including, 
''that the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any . . . proposals.''
 Notwithstanding that clear legal position, I assure the Committee that the Lord Chancellor will take into account the views of the heads of division in respect of any amendments to judicial titles in England and Wales. The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland will do so in the case of amendments to judicial titles in Northern Ireland, before making orders under the sections. That matter is enshrined in general principle and I am happy to confirm it explicitly in respect of the power to alter judicial titles. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Nick Hawkins: In the light of the Minister's clear assurances, I am happy to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 65 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 66 - Judges having powers of District Judges - (Magistrates' Courts)

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 70, in
clause 66, page 31, line 20, leave out from 'matters' to end of line 21.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 71, in 
clause 66, page 31, line 30, leave out subsection (4).

Nick Hawkins: We are considering an important part of the Bill that deals with the way in which family matters are considered. There is a number of further such issues to which we will return. I have detailed knowledge of them because during my years of practice at the Bar I worked in family law. The purpose of our amendments Nos. 70 and 71 is to question the Minister about whether it is wise to extend so widely the jurisdiction over family matters. These are specialised areas—too specialised to have the general extensions that are set out in clause 66(1)(b) and subsection (4).
 The safeguards that we need are not sufficiently set out in the Bill. I am probing the Minister about that, and I will listen with interest to what he says in response. If every holder of a judicial office as specified in subsection (2) has the powers of a JP who is a district judge in relation to family proceedings, that will be too wide. Specific skills are involved in hearing family law cases. Therefore, the Bill should not give a general power that is very wide. 
 I am not suggesting that, in practice, all holders of judicial office will find themselves hearing family cases, but I am sure that the Minister is well aware from the briefings that he has had in his short time in his new position that there are great sensitivities about family proceedings. The fact that so much parliamentary time has recently been taken up with issues such as domestic violence reinforces that point. 
 There was a time when I found myself regularly doing a number of tragic domestic violence cases. Domestic violence injunctions are a particularly harrowing aspect of the law. Back in the days when I was in practice, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some judges were much better at hearing those harrowing matters than others. 
 I am sure that the Minister understands the spirit behind what we are doing. It is worth while to query the provision, to hear what the Minister has to say and for that to be on the record. These are probing amendments. We want a categoric assurance from the Minister on what is an important issue.

Norman Lamb: I should take this opportunity to declare an interest: I am a member of the Law Society and a solicitor.
 I do not have enormous experience in this area but I share the hon. Gentleman's concerns. It is a specialist area and specific sensitivities are involved, and the transfer across may not always be appropriate. I would be interested to hear from the Minister how he expects the measure to work in practice. Will there be a list of specified judiciary who will be appropriate for transfer across?

Christopher Leslie: I wish to put on the record on behalf of the Government my strong belief that the lay magistracy who deal with family matters at present are entirely capable. They do an excellent job of running things, and they stand in judgment on family
 matters with confidence and the appropriate skills and judgment. We rightly have high confidence in the ability of the lay magistracy to handle complex and demanding family work.

David Kidney: I join my hon. Friend the Minister in paying tribute to the magistrates. However, they will sometimes recognise, often at an advanced stage in delicate family proceedings, that they are not the right people to be hearing a case because complexities have developed during the proceedings. At present, they have to transfer that case to a higher court for one of the kind of judges whom we are discussing. Would it not be better if they could bring the judges in, and thereby save a lot of delay? Is that not what the clause aims to do?

Christopher Leslie: My hon. Friend makes a valid point. Shortly, I will look at one example that illustrates why we need the provision.
 We want to allocate more family work to family proceedings courts, but we must also achieve the most effective and efficient distribution of caseload by ensuring that cases are heard at the lowest tier of court commensurate to their nature and complexity. That chimes in with my hon. Friend's point. 
 Clause 66 deals mainly with criminal proceedings, in which it might be convenient for a circuit judge sitting in the Crown court to turn himself into a district judge at magistrates court level to deal with a summary offence. We believe that, wherever possible, there should be consistency across jurisdictions, which is why the clause also applies to family proceedings. It is not, however, expected that extensive use would be made of those powers in family cases. 
 I shall give a practical example of when the clause might come in useful. The Government are considering whether to introduce specialist combined family centres, comprising co-located county and family proceedings courts. If, for example, a district judge at a magistrates court with a full list of family cases were to fall ill, the clause would enable a deputy circuit judge or a circuit judge to take on the case load if no other district judge at magistrates court level were available. That would help to reduce delays when the majority of listed cases could still be heard. 
 Opposition Members asked for more details about the selection process and the skills that some of the senior judiciary might bring to those limited areas in which we foresee the provisions applying to family cases. Although subsection (4) makes it clear that all High Court judges could be eligible, it also requires circuit judges to be specially nominated by the president of the family division. We understand that he would only make appropriate nominations, particularly for more qualified junior judges. That is the practical way in which skills would be matched with particular cases. That would also give a measure of protection if other members of the judiciary heard family proceedings cases. I hope that my assurance allays the concerns and that amendments Nos. 70 and 71 will be withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: It was worth while getting the Minister's assurances on the record. I, too, share the Minister's tribute, which was echoed by the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney), to those members of the lay magistracy who currently deal with family law cases. Their specialist knowledge, which they use when sitting on a family law panel of magistrates, is much appreciated by all court practitioners. In the light of Minister's reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 67 and 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69 - Criminal Procedure Rules

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Kidney: It is a pleasure to serve on a Committee under your watchful eye, Mr. O'Brien, and your firm but fair manner of dealing with proceedings.
 I should like to talk about two points about which I and other commentators have been concerned in the past. The first is about the trial of young persons charged with very serious offences. The second is whether there is a possibility of laying in children's proceedings when a criminal trial is taking place at the same time. Both points are relevant to the clause, which deals with a court's powers to make rules in criminal proceedings. They are also relevant to clauses 75 and 76, which deal with the similar power to make rules relating to family procedure rules. 
 My first concern is about prosecuting children for serious offences. People may recall from the trial of the killers of Jamie Bulger and the subsequent referral to the European Court of Human Rights the nature of proceedings in a Crown court for very young persons who are accused of serious offences. I am not suggesting that they are given an easy ride. According to the terms of our justice system, which assumes that people are innocent until proven guilty, people who appear in court should be spared 
''avoidable intimidation, humiliation or distress.''
 I take those words from the overriding principle contained in the Lord Chief Justice's practice direction of 16 February 2000, which was the result of the consideration of our Crown court procedures by the European Court of Human Rights. 
 Hon. Members may recall some of the directions that the Lord Chief Justice set out: where possible, the defendant should sit at the same level as the rest of the court; defendants should be free to sit with members of their family; proceedings should be explained to defendants as they go along; there should be frequent and regular breaks; robes and wigs should not be worn unless the defendant asks for them to be worn; restrictions should be imposed on the number of people attending a trial; and, although facilities for reporting the trial must be provided, consideration should be given to restricting the number of reporters present in the courtroom. Those directions were given in an attempt to ensure that there is a fair trial. 
 Concerns are often expressed that the great panoply of the Crown court venue would have difficulty fitting in with those directions. On many occasions, the youth court might be a more defendant-friendly venue for such trials. It might be more appropriate for the Crown court to agree to sit in the youth court.

Gareth Thomas: I am interested to hear my hon. Friend developing his points, speaking as he does from his experience as a solicitor. On the question of court apparel, he will be aware that that is the subject of some controversy, not only within the legal profession but society at large. Does he take the view that it would be appropriate not for the profession so much but for the Government to take a view as to the appropriateness of the ancient apparel that the profession requires barristers to wear?

Bill O'Brien: May I draw hon. Members attention to the fact that we are now discussing ''Criminal Procedure Rules''? I have not heard them mentioned yet. Will the hon. Gentleman address the clause?

David Kidney: Thank you, Mr. O'Brien. You have saved me from going down an avenue that I do not wish to go down even though my hon. Friend requested me to do so.
 At present, for serious charges against very young defendants, the direction of the Lord Chief Justice is the guiding rule for our courts. When the criminal procedure rule committee comes to make its rules, it would like to examine the Lord Chief Justice's practice direction and consider whether it should go further than that and make rules that embed those principles in the system. It wants to go a step further and consider saying that the youth court is, more often than not, a better venue than a Crown court building for the trials of these particular cases. I note that section 78 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 states that a Crown court may sit at any other place in England and Wales. Clearly, that includes sitting in a youth court. Clause 30 proposes that magistrates courts can sit in places other than the usual court, so the legislative network exists to allow trials to take place in the most appropriate venue for a fair outcome to the trial. 
 I am also concerned about those tragic cases in which young children are seriously injured while in the care of their parents as a result of physical and violent assault, sexual assault or a course of behaviour that affects them mentally rather than physically. In such cases, the criminal authorities often take the view that there should be a criminal prosecution of the parents for the alleged conduct. At the same time, the local authority will wish to protect the children, so it might take them away from the parents and begin care proceedings in the family courts—usually the local magistrates court sitting as a family court. 
 My hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, West (Gareth Thomas) said that I was a solicitor. I am not practising at present, but I was a solicitor for 20 years and I dealt with many children's cases. In such cases, I found that the care proceedings involving the children were usually delayed for many months—if not for more than a year—until the criminal trial took place to see whether the parents were found guilty of the conduct that had damaged the children. The usual 
 reason given for that delay was that the parents were restrained from presenting their full case in the care proceedings because they had a right not to incriminate themselves in any criminal matter that was about to be dealt with in the criminal court. Often, the criminal trial had to take place first, and it took a long time because of the complexities of the case, so the children were left drifting in care for a long while. No permanent plans for them were made until there was a result to the criminal trial: only then could there be an end to the care proceedings. I am concerned about that. My plea with regard to the criminal procedure rules—and the family procedure rules, which we will come to later—is that we address that problem. It is unacceptable because the Children Act 1989 states that the welfare of the child comes first, and delay causes harm to children's development. 
 There have already been judicial attempts to stop that delay. In the Re TB (Care Proceedings: Criminal Trial) case in the Court of Appeal in 1995, Lord Justice Butler-Sloss said: 
''Each case has to be seen on its own facts and considered on its own merits, and the welfare of the child has to take priority over the detriment to the family who are coming up for trial . . . One starts with the fact that the criminal proceedings of themselves are not a reason to adjourn the care proceedings.''
 She went on: 
''There is a Home Office circular that deals with any delay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of a criminal trial so that the criminal court shall be notified of the importance of bringing on that criminal trial as quickly as possible.''
 Therefore, Lord Justice Butler-Sloss stated that the care proceedings should not automatically be held off for the criminal trial and, in any case, that the criminal court should be informed that something urgent is waiting on the outcome of such a trial so that the criminal proceedings can be expedited.

Nick Hawkins: I have been listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has said. In my practice at the Bar, I had similar experiences to those that he describes. I share his concerns. The comments of Lord Justice Butler-Sloss in that leading case should be taken into account. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that sometimes it would be very helpful if the criminal courts were obliged to take into account the wording that he has referred to—the welfare of the children is the first and paramount consideration? Perhaps that should be imported in some way into the criminal law.

David Kidney: I thank the hon. Gentleman for those words, which are music to my ears. In the drafting of the rules that this clause permits the criminal procedure rule committee to make—and in the drafting of the family procedure rules that we are about to come on to—I would like there to be a much stronger emphasis on the welfare of the child and the principle that delays in proceedings may cause harm to children. I want to ensure that this situation is not a problem in the future.
 This Bill gives us flexibility. For example, when this is the situation, a High Court judge, who has the skills to ensure that there is the protection against self-incrimination for parents and that the care 
 proceedings proceed quickly, can be drafted in to the family court premises to hear the care proceedings. We could also get on to the family court proceedings more quickly because we might have a centre in which the family proceedings and the criminal trial take place in the same building. That would help to hurry up the criminal proceedings. 
 I am asking for urgency on behalf of children. I hope that the Committee, the Minister and those who eventually form the membership of the rule committees take the need for this urgency on board and do something about what has caused serious harm to children in the past.

Christopher Leslie: I am glad that we have had the opportunity to consider and discuss some wider aspects of policy and how those may touch on criminal procedure rules. I am not, however, entirely convinced that all the matters about which my hon. Friend spoke would be relevant to the criminal procedure rule committee—and I shall briefly explain why.
 The clause introduces the principle that rules of court will govern the practice and procedure to be followed in the criminal courts in England and Wales. Those rules will be made by a new criminal procedure rule committee. Such measures are necessary to reduce the variety of approaches, which are a consequence of the current fragmented arrangements for making rules of court. Hopefully, we can modernise and streamline the processes by bringing them together under the criminal procedure rule committee. The clause directs that the power to make or alter rules should be exercised with a view to ensuring that the criminal justice system is accessible, fair and efficient, and the rules are simple and simply expressed. It expresses the principles that will be central to the work of the committee. 
 The measures are intended to ensure that new rules are developed with an underlying regard for the efficient running of a trial; it is also intended that they should be developed in such a way that the ordinary person in the street is capable of understanding how the processes and procedures work. Under the clause, criminal procedure rules may be made with different provisions for different cases or areas. It ensures that those can be made in support of new initiatives and that they may allow for pilot schemes to be established when it is necessary to do so. The clause will similarly allow for rules to be made that will govern specified courts or proceedings, such as youth courts. That was the main purpose behind the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford. 
 First, my hon. Friend explained in detail his views on care proceedings. He said that they are often delayed because the requirement for there to be a criminal aspect leads to involvement in consequential issues. He was concerned that there were perhaps undue delays caused by differences between the different processes. This is a complex matter. Without going into too much detail, I can tell the Committee that we have a general duty to reduce the 
 number of ineffective trials and ensure that the courts system works as efficiently as possible. We should ensure, as far as possible, that the interests of children are put at the top of our agenda. 
 I should not wish to give my hon. Friend the impression that the criminal procedure rule committee could deal with all the things that he mentioned, some of which were touched on in the White Paper, ''Justice for All''. Some of his specific points—for example, about the concern that is being shown in the system, and ensuring that the interests of children are looked after—have been brought to the forefront of policy. We must continue to ensure that that happens. 
 Secondly, my hon. Friend spoke about the venue for hearing serious offences involving children. He talked in particular about court layout and how plain dress might be adopted. Incidentally, we are in the middle of a consultation on court dress and I would not want to pre-empt that. That matter is being considered.

Nick Hawkins: The Minister should be aware that there is resistance from the official Opposition to the constant suggestion that such things are part of a drive towards so-called modernisation. Many hon. Members who practised at the Bar for many years believe that there are good reasons, which are too difficult to discuss in this brief intervention, why court dress has survived in its present form for many hundreds of years. I hope that the Minister will take that into account in any consultation.

Christopher Leslie: I only mentioned that in passing, but I should have known that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath would find a way to introduce his antipathy to modernisation—indeed, to anything to do with the concept of modernity. I am sure that he is glad to have got that out of his system.
 I can sympathise with the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, who says that in certain cases involving children we have to take account of the impact of court layout and the formality and nature of the court in order to secure a fair trial. However, the issue of the venue for trial—for example, whether it is heard in a Crown court or a youth court—is a matter for primary legislation, and would not come under the remit of the rule committee, although the issue of more child-friendly procedures for a Crown court case would. I know that my hon. Friend has a number of specific suggestions, and it is valid for him to raise the subject. By putting it on the record today, we are highlighting some of the issues that the criminal procedure rule committee might well consider.

David Kidney: My hon. Friend the Minister says that the venue in which the court sits is a matter for primary legislation—but I referred to section 78 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, which says:
''Any Crown Court business may be conducted at any place in England and Wales''.
 Does he accept that that legislation permits a venue other than a Crown court building?

Christopher Leslie: I do not want to go through every aspect of statute law, but my understanding is that there are certain restrictions on where trials for grave offences
 can be held. For example, murder cases have to go to the Crown court. I also understand that various Acts of Parliament, including the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, have restraining influences on where certain cases can be heard. If I am wrong, I will be happy to write to my hon. Friend and the Committee to correct myself. With that, I hope that the concept of criminal procedure rules in the clause will remain, and that the clause will stand part of the Bill.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70 - Criminal Procedure Rule Committee

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 137, in
clause 70, page 33, line 9, leave out 'and'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 138, in 
clause 70, page 33, line 11, at end insert 
 ', and 
 (l) one legal executive who has particular experience of practice in criminal courts.'.
 Amendment No. 140, in 
clause 77, page 36, line 35, leave out 'and'.
 Amendment No. 141, in 
clause 77, page 36, line 37, at end insert 
 ', and 
 (p) one legal executive who has particular experience of practice in family proceedings.'.
 Amendment No. 143, in 
clause 83, page 38, line 35, leave out 'and'.
 Amendment No. 144, in 
clause 83, page 38, line 37, at end add 
 ', and 
 (h) one legal executive who has particular experience of practice in county courts.''.'.
 Amendment No. 136, in 
clause 105, page 57, line 41, at end insert— 
 '(10) In this Act ''legal executive'' means a Fellow of the Institute of Legal Executives.'.

Nick Hawkins: This is a large group of amendments, and I am indebted for them to my friends at the Institute of Legal Executives, who do an excellent job—I hope that the Minister will confirm that—and are part of the backbone of the legal profession in this country.
 Most members of the Committee will probably already know that legal executives are employed in solicitors' offices and in local government to conduct criminal work. They have a wide range of responsibilities, including giving advice to clients, preparing cases for trial in both magistrates and Crown courts, and seeing clients at police stations and prisons. Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives, who specialise in criminal work, are accredited police station representatives, and representatives of the institute have contributed substantially to the review 
 of the operation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
 Legal executives employed in local government have rights of audience in a magistrates court under section 223 of the Local Government Act 1972. That allows authorised officers of a local authority to prosecute or defend cases in magistrates courts on behalf of that authority. I know from having worked with many legal executives over the years that it is not easy to obtain a legal executive's professional qualification; a great deal of work and study goes into qualifying as a fellow of the institute, particularly, but much work is also involved in the lower exams. 
 Legal executives, by virtue of their professional qualifications, their experience of magistrates courts work and the regulatory regime under which they operate, are entirely suitable, in my view, to be considered for appointment to the criminal procedure rule committee. There should be provision in the Bill to provide for legal executives' particular practical expertise at the sharp end of preparing criminal cases to be represented on the criminal procedure rule committee. 
 I hope that when the Minister responds, he will acknowledge the work that has been done by the Institute of Legal Executives and by all their members, especially their fellows. Even if he cannot accept the amendment today, I hope that he will be prepared to say that the Government will look carefully at the advantage of involving the institute. 
 We tabled amendment No. 141 to clause 77 on a similar matter. It, too, relates to the role of legal executives in public and private family matters. Legal executives have a wide range of responsibilities, including giving advice and preparing cases for trial in the county court, the High Court and the magistrates court. Anyone who has been involved in family cases, as I have been—I am sure that the hon. Member for Stafford and some other hon. Members will have had similar experiences—knows that a great deal of the work could not be done without experienced legal executives. 
 Legal executives have rights of audience on family matters in chambers in the county court and in the High Court. Those who are employed in local government have rights of audience in the family proceedings court under the Local Government Act 1972. Those who are authorised as legal executive advocates by the institute have rights of audience in open court, not only in chambers in the county court, as well as before magistrates in family and related proceedings in the family proceedings court. Legal executives who satisfy the Law Society's criteria, by having the required years of experience and the requisite hours of chargeable work, are eligible for membership of Law Society panels, including the family law panel, the family law panel advanced and the family mediation panel. Legal executive advocates are eligible for membership of the children's panel. 
 We consider that it should be clearly stated in the Bill that the practical expertise of legal executives in 
 family proceedings should be used on the family procedure rule committee, too. That is why we have suggested amendment No. 141. Similarly, amendment No. 144 relates to the civil procedure rule committee under clause 83. Again, legal executives are heavily involved in the Law Society panels, such as the civil and commercial mediation panel, the clinical negligence panel and the personal injury panel. It would therefore be helpful if it were clearly stated in the Bill that a legal executive who has particular experience of the practice in the county courts could be a member of the civil procedure rule committee. That is the basis on which we are suggesting that improvements could be made in the Bill to recognise the crucial work of legal executives. 
 I hope that the Minister, even if he cannot accept our amendments, will at least say that the Government will continue to keep the matter in mind and may table amendments at a later stage to incorporate the work of legal executives and the contribution that they can make to the different rule committees.

Norman Lamb: I support the comments made by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. I speak from experience as a solicitor and, in my early years, as a solicitor in local government, so I am aware of the rights of audience of legal executives in the range of courts described by the hon. Gentleman. Although legal executives may not have the same breadth and depth of training across the range of legal provision as solicitors and barristers, none the less their expertise in the areas in which they specialise is often deep, and well worth acknowledging by giving them a role on the committees that will be established under the Bill.
 The Minister ought to respond to the amendments by considering them seriously and giving the fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives the standing that they deserve by allowing them to contribute to the rule-making process.

Christopher Leslie: The nature of the work of legal executives is important in ensuring that the legal system in its broadest sense works smoothly and effectively. As the hon. Member for Surrey Heath suggested, I wish to take the opportunity to put on record my thanks to the Institute of Legal Executives for provoking the debate.
 I understand that it prompted the hon. Gentleman to table specific amendments for discussion in Committee. It is perfectly legitimate that he has done so, but the amendments are not necessary. 
 I shall not distinguish between the different natures of criminal, family or civil procedure rule committees, because the reason why the amendments should not be accepted applies to differing circumstances. 
 For a start, the membership of the committee is already capable of ensuring a broad range of representation, comprising not only the judiciary, the legal profession and the voluntary sector, but individuals from other organisations with particular experience in various jurisdictions. I recognise that important and excellent work is undertaken by legal executives throughout the country, but it would be a 
 leap to say that the currently suggested members of committees, especially solicitors, could not bring the full coverage of specialist knowledge or value to the process of making procedural rules, and that we would need specifically to make legal executives part of the membership. Those whom we envisage as members of the rules committees will be capable of covering such specialist work adequately. 
 For example, the civil procedure rule committee will be made up of practising solicitors who have direct experience of the processes in which legal executives become involved. Such people are capable of representing that cadre of interests on the committee. The strategic purpose of the committees is to produce procedural rules that benefit the administration throughout the criminal, family and civil jurisdictions. That requires a broad understanding of the justice system, as well as an understanding of the details of specific court procedures. Adequate specialist interest will be represented. 
 If a committee is discussing an issue that requires the specific input of legal executives, there will be nothing to prevent it from asking representative organisations for their views or advice. The opportunity for the committee to consult different organisations, including the Institute of Legal Executives and representatives of legal executives in general, will exist. It is possible for committee proceedings to be informed by consultation and dialogue with organisations such as the Institute of Legal Executives. Simply because the committee's membership may not explicitly comprise legal executives, that would not preclude their views from forming part of its consideration.

Norman Lamb: Will the criminal procedure rule committee have a role in determining rights of audience before courts?

Christopher Leslie: I understand that that will not be the remit of the criminal procedure rule committee—inspiration has struck me just at the right moment, as members of the Committee may have noticed. It would not be right to lose the flexibility of the membership of the committee as set out under the Bill. If circumstance change in future, it is possible that we could alter membership if something was so transparently obvious and we had missed a particular set of expertise from membership of the committee. At present, the composition lists strike the right balance, and in view of the obvious respect that the Committee has shown to the work of legal executives, I hope that hon. Members consider that we have struck the right balance.

Nick Hawkins: I am disappointed with the Minister's response. It is not good enough to say that solicitors can deal with such matters.
 As I made clear, there are many cases in which legal executives do so. They are so much in control of the case at the sharp end, that in many cases their expertise is different from that of solicitors. Given the way in which the rules committees will operate, they would have specific expertise and skill to offer, and it is important to state that in the Bill. I shall therefore press amendment No. 138 to a division when the time 
 comes—but I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment No 137. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 72, in
clause 70, page 33, line 10, leave out 'appear to'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 27, in
clause 70, page 33, line 11, at end insert 
 'one of whom must be from an organisation which represents victims of crime'.

Nick Hawkins: We are now on to a different subject. I wish to include a requirement in subsection (2)(k) that the people who will be undertaking the work represent voluntary organisations, rather than merely appear to do so. Amendment No. 27 would ensure specific representation for those who are working on behalf of victims of crime.
 For many years I have worked with Victim Support, as other hon. Members have, including my hon. Friend the Member for Upminster (Angela Watkinson). Far too often in our criminal courts, the interests of victims are forgotten. I therefore felt that it was important to amend the clause so that it would be clear that the interests of victims of crime would be represented. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve. My argument can be shortly stated, but the brevity of my remarks should not suggest that I do not feel strongly about it. 
 The Bill deals with the way in which courts will be administered in the future, and if we do not include specific requirements to ensure that the interests of victims of crime are looked after, we will have missed a great opportunity. Conservative Members feel strongly about that matter, and I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment, or something akin to it.

Angela Watkinson: I support the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath on amendments Nos. 72 and 27. Amendment 72 would leave out the words ''appear to'' from clause 70(2)(k). Nowadays, many people of good standing and long service—school governors, for example—are required to take passports to schools to prove their identity to people who have worked with them and known them well for many years. The Lord Chancellor should therefore be able to ensure that people appointed to the criminal procedure rule committee are indeed representatives of voluntary organisations, rather than merely appearing to be so. That is a small point but an important one.
 Amendment No. 27 would ensure that one of the people representing voluntary organisations was specifically involved with victim support. There is a perception among the general public, most of whom never come into contact with the courts, and victims of crime, some but by no means all of whom come into contact with courts, that the rights of offenders often take precedence over the rights of victims of crime. The presence of an organisation such as Victim Support would add overt confidence to the system, so I hope that the Minister will support the amendment.

Norman Lamb: I am pleased that voluntary organisations are to be represented on the committee. That makes eminent sense, and it is an advance. I want to press the Minister on what on earth is meant by the words ''appear to''. They seem bizarre, and would be much better left out. On the issue of representation for victims of crime, there is, as has been said, the feeling that victims are ignored as part of the process. That has improved a little of late, and there is now more recognition of their clear and important interest in the process. It is eminently sensible that they be represented by at least one person on the committee.

Christopher Leslie: The hon. Member for Surrey Heath did not speak in depth about amendment No. 72, but the hon. Member for Upminster focused on it. It will therefore be useful to deal with the two amendments in the group separately.
 I shall explain why the interesting words ''appear to'' are included in the clause. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) gently reminded the Committee about that very matter last week. The reason why the phrase appears in the provisions is to avoid arguments about who is and who is not a representative of a particular organisation. For example, if the president of an organisation proposed a named individual, who was not an elected officer, to represent the organisation, there might be an argument if the clause said that the person concerned ''must'' represent the organisation. The clause says ''appear to'' to ensure that particular individuals can be put forward without getting into formal legal arguments about whether someone is a representative in the strictest sense of the word. That is why an individual who is not necessarily an officer with an executive capacity can be nominated or suggested by a particular body. That is the explanation that I have been given, and I hope that hon. Members can live with it.

Angela Watkinson: I think that the Minister answered the question that was on my lips: will any such representative have been nominated by the organisation?

Christopher Leslie: To answer that would then prompt questions about formal nomination and whether there were contested points about who was representative of particular organisations. Flexibility has traditionally been contained in paragraphs such as these to ensure that there is no disagreement about whether somebody represents an organisation in an official capacity.

Boris Johnson: Is it logically possible for a person to be appointed who does not represent either a voluntary organisation or, as was mentioned in a previous clause, the Association of Chief Police Officers?

Christopher Leslie: No. The paragraphs specifically state that persons who appear to represent organisations can be part of the composition of committees. That is clear. The reason why the provision says ''appear to represent'' is to avoid disagreement. For example, a president of a victim support organisation might nominate a longstanding colleague or an affiliate of a particular organisation, who may not be at that time a chief executive or a formal representative of the first
 organisation. However, they would still be entitled to come to the committee, even though they did not formally represent that wider organisation.
 It would be splitting hairs a little if hon. Members were to seek to push this too far, but if the hon. Gentleman still wishes to raise an issue, this is the place to do it. I do not think that he wishes to do so. 
 Amendment No. 27 would require that one of the two representatives of voluntary organisations must be from an organisation that represents the victims of crime. We want to broaden the voice of those affected by crime who work in the criminal justice system, which is why we have included certain measures with regard to the establishment of the criminal procedure rules committee. We want to ensure that we have broader coverage and unity across the criminal justice system for procedures in court. Subsection (2)(k) on voluntary organisations has been included so that we can find representatives ''who appear to'' come from those sections of the community and so that they have a voice on a particular committee. That is the intention. 
 We hope to have representatives of victims' organisations on the criminal procedure rules committee, but it is unnecessary to have an explicit reference, given that it is clear from how we have set out those provisions on the establishment of that committee that there is the capability to have that representation—for the first time, I might add.

Angela Watkinson: I would like there to be a provision that avoids both those representatives being representatives of groups that specifically look after the interests of offenders, so that there is a balance on the committee with regard to looking after the rights of offenders and victims.

Christopher Leslie: I entirely accept that point, which is reasonable.
 More than two different voluntary organisations are involved in this work. We want sufficient flexibility to ensure that we get the broadest possible representation on the committee, which is why it would be wrong to start to subdivide areas where there is already subdivision. 
 I hope that that comment reassures Committee members that we wish many parts of the community, particularly those affected by crime, to have a voice on procedure rule committees. However, I would not want to pre-empt anything by specifying the individuals who are going to be on them. 
 I accept the spirit of the points that have been raised. The provision has been included in this clause so that we can have those voices represented on the committees. I hope that Members welcome it as a step forward.

Nick Hawkins: We welcome the provision as a partial step forward, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Upminster rightly said, our concern is that if the Bill is left in its current form it would be possible for both people who appear to represent voluntary organisations to be from organisations that represent the interests of offenders, rather than those
 of victims. That is why both amendments are extremely important. I shall not press both to a Division, however, but I must ask for amendment No. 27 to be put to the vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment proposed: No. 27, in 
clause 70, page 33, line 11, at end insert 
 'one of whom must be from an organisation which represents victims of crime'.—[Mr. Hawkins.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Amendment proposed: No. 138, in 
clause 70, page 33, line 11, at end insert 
 ', and 
 (l) one legal executive who has particular experience of practice in criminal courts.'.—[Mr. Hawkins.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in
clause 70, page 33, line 17, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 74, in 
clause 70, page 33, line 19, after 'Committee', insert 
 'necessarily incurred in the course of their work as members of the Committee.'.
 No. 80, in 
clause 77, page 37, line 1, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.
 No. 81, in 
clause 77, page 37, line 2, at end insert 
 'necessarily incurred in the course of their work as members of the Committee'.

Nick Hawkins: This is the traditional amendment that would change ''may'' to ''shall''. We think it important that there should be a direct tool for paying
 expenses. We have talked at length about the important role that people have in our criminal justice system, and ''shall'' would be much more appropriate than ''may'' in all the examples in which that word appears in the clause. That is a brief point, and I shall listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.

Norman Lamb: It seems appropriate to impose an obligation to reimburse, and also to narrow it down. The clause clearly defines the expenses as those incurred in the course of the work of members of the committee. I therefore support the amendment.

Christopher Leslie: I understand that the amendment in many ways mirrors those tabled by Opposition peers in another place and subsequently withdrawn, in that discretion would be removed in the payment of expenses to members of the criminal and family procedure rule committees for their work. Obviously, we want to reimburse the travel and out-of-pocket expenses that committee members necessarily incur in the course of their work.
 The provisions in the Bill are identical to those that the Lord Chancellor has in relation to the civil procedure rules committee. Members of that committee are routinely reimbursed for their travel and out-of-pocket expenses, and there have not been any problems with that. We use ''may'' rather than ''shall'' to ensure that there is discretion in paying expenses, that we do not have an open-ended and uncontrolled budget on expenses, and that we also can monitor what the expenditure is on those payments and may ensure that they are made in accordance with departmental financial controls. 
 If there were a compulsory automatic payment and the word ''shall'' were included, my Department's discretion regarding the payment of those expenses could be inhibited. That is why the word ''may'' is used. I am sure that Committee members would not want that automaticity in the Bill, because it could lead to open-ended expenses claims that could not be controlled, tempered or monitored by the Department.

Norman Lamb: Is not the way to control payments to limit them to expenses that are necessarily incurred? If there were a test of necessity, the Department could thus control the expenses.

Christopher Leslie: But then there would be disagreement and potential litigation over the word ''necessarily''. What one person regards as being incurred necessarily may not be regarded as such by another. I am sure that Committee members can think of many good examples in which such a concept would be contested.
 The flexibility in the current wording is necessary to ensure that the Department has discretion and that no budget is simply demand led. We intend to honour expenses, and we have a system for properly reimbursing them and for protecting public finances. Discretion must be written in the Bill in this way to ensure that we strike the right balance and safeguard public accounts. I hope that the amendments are resisted.

Nick Hawkins: I shall not labour the point. It has been helpful to get on the record the Minister's
 assurance that expenses will be paid properly and that the Government do not intend to do otherwise. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 72 - Process for making Criminal Procedure Rules

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 139, in
clause 72, page 33, line 32, at end insert— 
 '( ) consult any body which is an authorised body for the purposes of section 27 of the 1990 Act or section 28 of the 1990 Act (as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999),'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 142, in 
clause 79, page 37, line 12, at end insert— 
 '( ) consult any body which is an authorised body for the purposes of section 27 of the 1990 Act or section 28 of the 1990 Act (as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999),'.
 No. 145, in 
clause 85, page 39, line 25, at end insert— 
 '( ) consult any body which is an authorised body for the purposes of section 27 of the 1990 Act or section 28 of the 1990 Act (as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999),'.

Nick Hawkins: Again, I am indebted to the Institute of Legal Executives for briefing me and informing me that such important matters should be included.
 The criminal procedure rules will govern the practice and procedure to be followed in the criminal courts. The Bill as drafted simply provides for the criminal procedure rules committee to 
''consult such persons as they consider appropriate''.
 In April 1998, the Institute of Legal Executives was added as an authorised body in its own right to the categories that already included the Bar Council and the Law Society. It was thus enabled to grant rights of audience to suitably qualified legal executives under section 27 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. Currently, the institute is able to grant only civil and matrimonial rights of audience, but it has submitted an application to extend that to criminal proceedings. I hope that the Minister and his colleagues in the new Department will consider that application favourably. 
 The Institute of Legal Executives is also a body authorised to conduct litigation under section 28 of the 1990 Act, as amended by section 40 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, and it is sensible, in the light of those matters, that there should be provision for consultation with all the representatives of all the different parts of the legal profession, including the institute. That would ensure that all the people consulted had knowledge and experience of the rules and criminal processes. Our amendment No. 139 would achieve that. 
 Our amendment No. 142 would make exactly the same change for family procedure rules, which we think would be helpful, and amendment No. 145, 
 which is to clause 85, would achieve the same aim in relation to civil procedure rules. 
 I hope that the Minister understands our concerns, which we share with the Institute of Legal Executives, and that even if he cannot accept the amendments today, he will continue to keep the matter under review and perhaps introduce similar Government amendments at a later stage.

Christopher Leslie: I will examine the matter raised tangentially by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath in respect of the Institute of Legal Executives in more detail when I get back to the Department. First, however, I should like to deal with the three amendments. They would require formal consultation with the bodies listed in sections 27 and 28 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, including the General Council of the Bar, the Law Society, the Institute of Legal Executives and others, before the procedure rule committees make any rules of court or submit them to the Lord Chancellor.
 The first point to note is that the Bill does not prevent consultation with any of those bodies. Indeed, it is entirely likely that the procedure rule committees will try appropriately to consult bodies that they feel could add to their work. I assure the Committee that major revisions of procedure rules will have full public consultation, which is a proportionate and sensible approach. For lesser procedural issues and minor matters, there may be a requirement to have less formal processes for consultation, but to have to go through formal consultation on smaller, uncontroversial matters would be excessive. 
 Given that major revisions will have full public consultation, and that consultation with any of the bodies listed is likely, I believe that it is right to leave flexibility in the process of consultation. The formality that the amendments would introduce would be unduly prescriptive and rigid, and as the procedure rule committees will be made up of experts, they will be well placed to determine the extent of their consultation before making rules. On that basis, I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful to the Minister for his opening comment and the commitment to examine the other issue, which he said that I raised tangentially. I am sure that the Institute of Legal Executives will also be grateful for that assurance. I am not entirely happy that the Minister cannot accept our proposals, but his words are helpful and will be further considered by the institute before Report. At this stage, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 75, in
clause 72, page 33, line 38, leave out 
 ', with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,'.
 This is a probing amendment. We wonder whether we need the phrase 
''with the concurrence of the Secretary of State''.
 When I first read the wording, my worry was that it would provide a recipe for further battles between the 
 Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor or judges and lawyers more generally. We have seen quite a few of those battles in recent times. The Home Secretary seems to be addicted to attacking judges and lawyers, whenever he wants a cheap headline. However, that has not served him well—it has merely upset many of the senior judiciary. It has been made clear in another place that judicial independence is a crucial part of the United Kingdom's constitutional arrangements. I hope that, one day, the Home Secretary will learn that it is not sensible to make the sort of comments that he has made about the way in which our legal system operates. 
 The amendment seeks to remove the provision in clause 72 that says that the Lord Chancellor has to have 
''the concurrence of the Secretary of State.''
 It is not clear whether the provision refers to the Home Secretary or to any other Secretary of State. I have heard the Minister mention that the term ''Secretary of State'' may be regarded more generally. However, in the light of the Government's announcement that they intend to abolish the title of ''Lord Chancellor''—if they can get away with it—it is slightly surreal to see the Lord Chancellor referred to in so many parts of the Bill, and particularly in this clause. I shall therefore listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.

Norman Lamb: I would like first to press the Minister to clarify which Secretary of State is referred to in the clause. Secondly, does not the involvement of the Secretary of State—or the Home Secretary—muddy the waters with regard to the separation of powers, and lead to the possibility of undue and inappropriate influence being exerted on the rules that are made by the committee? Would it not be more appropriate simply to leave out the reference to the ability of the Home Secretary or other Secretary of State to alter or to amend the rules made by the committee?

Christopher Leslie: I am slightly perplexed as to why amendment No. 75 seeks to remove the need for the Home Secretary to concur with the rules made by the criminal procedure rule committee, because the consequence of that would be to give the Lord Chancellor alone the power to allow, disallow or alter the rules made by that committee. I would have thought that Opposition Members wanted Secretaries of State to adopt a more collegiate approach. The strongest reason for the Home Secretary to be involved in that area is the fact that he has wide responsibility for criminal justice policy. I believe that, in a policy sense, it is right for the Home Secretary to be involved in and to concur with any changes to those rules.
 I believe that a closer and increasingly integrated approach should be adopted by all three Ministries concerned with criminal justice, and that we should ensure that there is greater consistency, collaboration and discussion between all branches of the criminal justice service. That approach has already been adopted, but to reiterate it in the clause is the right way forward. 
 To answer the question asked by the hon. Member for North Norfolk, the term ''Secretary of State'' refers to the Home Secretary. I understand that the Interpretations Act 1978 allows references to Secretaries of State in legislation to be generic, in the sense that any Secretary of State has the statutory ability to take on the function of any other Secretary of State. A generic reference is therefore adequate for the purposes of drafting. There is no particular issue at stake, because the Lord Chancellor currently performs many of those functions in his capacity as a Minister of the Crown, and, in future, there will be a separate Secretary of State for the Department for Constitutional Affairs, who will work in tandem with the Home Secretary. I therefore do not believe that there is a problem. It is right that different Ministries should work in parallel with each other on criminal procedure rules. That is why the Committee should resist the amendment.

Nick Hawkins: I do not think the Minister can claim that his colleagues at the most senior level of Government have been operating recently in a collegiate fashion. The huge rivalries and resentments within the Cabinet are very much in the public domain. For the Minister to say that senior Ministers in the Government should work in a collegiate manner takes some gall.
 I understand that the Minister is not going to accept our amendment. I said that we were probing the matter, and we have succeeded in teasing out the fact that the phrase ''Secretary of State'' refers to the Home Secretary. As I anticipated when tabling the amendment, it may be a recipe for further battles in future when the Home Secretary seeks to be as aggressively—and often mistakenly—populist as the current Home Secretary. However, I am not going to take up the Committee's time by dividing on the matter today. Having placed the point on the record, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 76, in
clause 72, page 33, line 39, leave out ', disallow or alter' and insert 'or disallow'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 77, in 
clause 72, page 33, line 41, leave out 'or altered'.
 Amendment No. 82, in 
clause 79, page 37, line 18, leave out ', disallow or alter' and insert 'or disallow'.
 Amendment No. 83, in 
clause 79, page 37, line 19, leave out subsection (4).
 Amendment No. 84, in 
clause 79, page 37, line 20, leave out 'or altered'.
 Amendment No. 89, in 
clause 85, page 39, line 31, leave out ', disallow or alter' and insert 'or disallow'.
 Amendment No. 91, in 
clause 85, page 39, line 34, leave out 'or altered'.

Nick Hawkins: This group of amendments seeks to make changes in relation to the criminal procedure rules. There are similar amendments to clauses 79 and 85 for family and civil procedure.
 In our amendments, we have said that the Lord Chancellor should be able to allow or disallow the rules but not to alter them, because the criminal procedure rule committee and the equivalents for family and civil procedure should be making the decisions. The Lord Chancellor—any Lord Chancellor—should not then—

Norman Lamb: I am slightly confused. The hon. Gentleman suggests that the Lord Chancellor should be able to allow or disallow, but amendment No. 76 states
''leave out ', disallow or alter'''.
 Will the hon. Gentleman clarify that point?

Nick Hawkins: The hon. Gentleman may be right to point that out. My point is that we intend in the group of amendments that the Lord Chancellor should not be able to substitute his judgment for that of the procedure rule committees that make the decisions and that are specialists in the various sectors: crime, family law and civil procedure. We seek to put in some protection to ensure that the committees call the shots and that the Lord Chancellor should not be able to tinker. I hope that the Minister will understand what we are seeking to achieve.

Stephen Hesford: Is it the hon. Gentleman's understanding that the criminal procedure rule committee has a mandatory function or an advisory function, with the Executive function left to the Lord Chancellor and others?

Nick Hawkins: The criminal procedure rule committee, and the similar committees for civil procedure and family law, will, as clause 72(1)(a) states,
''consult such persons as they consider appropriate''.
 They will then make the rules signed by a majority of their members, who are experts used to dealing with such matters at the sharp end. It should not then be for the Lord Chancellor to tinker. That is our proposition shortly stated. I hope the Minister will take it seriously, and I will listen with interest to his response.

Norman Lamb: I rise to speak in support of the amendments and to deal with the intervention from the hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford), who describes the committee as conceivably advisory, when it is there to draft, prepare and consult on the rules. Its function is clearly far more statutory than simply advisory. It would be bizarre to create a committee stuffed full of expertise, as the Bill describes, but then to allow the Lord Chancellor to override that and to vary or to disallow the rules that it makes. Surely if we create a committee with the expertise to enable it to draft, prepare and consult on those rules, it should be left to it to confirm them. I agree with the amendment, which would delete ''disallow or alter''.

Christopher Leslie: I am slightly taken aback by the views of Opposition Members, who are usually guardians and bastions of accountability and of ensuring that Ministers are held to account for decisions that are taken. We envisage that the criminal procedure rule committees will rightly make the rules for procedures in courts daily. Those rules, however, are made with Ministers' approval, and provisions are set out for altering or disallowing them so that, in certain extreme or rare circumstances, any disagreements or discussions can be resolved quickly and the process can move on.
 If there were a disagreement between procedure rule committees and the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chancellor's ability to alter those rules would mean that there was no eternal toing and froing between those committees. That ability would be used in only the most extreme and unforeseen circumstances. However, we are in effect talking about secondary legislation, so we need that safeguard, not least so that Ministers are accountable, not least to Parliament. My hon. Friend the Member for Wirral, West was right to raise the general issue about broader accountability. 
 We want to delegate much of the work to the procedure rule committees, but we want that long-stop capability in place. This matter was the subject of quite a lot of debate in the other place. The Government listened to much of that debate, and accepted that the ability to alter the rules would be used only in rare and extreme circumstances, and that such alteration would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. That would give Parliament a higher level of scrutiny than the proposal to allow the Lord Chancellor simply to alter the rules. It would also ensure that Parliament had the opportunity to consider fully the exercise of that power by the Lord Chancellor. 
 We have already conceded the need for the affirmative resolution procedure, so I believe that we have struck the right balance to ensure that Parliament has its say in overseeing the powers of the Lord Chancellor in this respect. We have therefore completed the credibility process. I hope that hon. Members can now see why we need the provision to alter powers in that manner.

Nick Hawkins: In the light of the Minister's remarks, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 73 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77 - Family Procedure Rule Committee

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 79, in
clause 77, page 36, line 36, leave out 'one person with' and insert 'two persons with current'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 87, in
clause 83, page 38, line 36, after 'with', insert 'current'.

Nick Hawkins: We are suggesting that the Bill should include the fact that there is a need for two people,
 rather than one person, with current experience of the lay advice sector. Two people are set out in clause 83, so why not two people in clause 77? For clause 83, we have tabled a more restricted amendment to make it clear that we are talking about people with ''current'' experience.
 We want to ensure that those who understand the lay advice sector are fully involved. People such as those in citizens advice bureaux feel strongly about that, so I hope that the Minister will be able to respond positively to what, after all, is a modest change to the Bill. Even if he cannot accept our proposed wording today, I hope that he will accept that it would be helpful to table something along these lines in a Government amendment at a later stage.

Christopher Leslie: Although I sympathise with some of the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath in advocating amendment No. 87, on reflection there might be difficulties with inserting the words ''current experience'' in the clause. My argument follows on from some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Upminster. She expressed worry that experience can sometimes be lost when we have cut-offs and allow people to serve only if a current definition can be applied to them. I suspect that she might be concerned about this amendment.

Stephen Hesford: Does my hon. Friend agree that, if the form of words in the amendment were included in the Bill, the Committee would be bereft of the benefit of the experience that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath brings? I know that his experience goes back to the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Christopher Leslie: I am not sure that it is fair to characterise the hon. Gentleman purely as having experience from the 1970s and 1980s. I am sure that he has experience of matters in the 1990s and the new century. I do not know whether he is applying to be a member of the family procedure rule committee, and it would not be fair for me to go into any details. All the
 normal Nolan committee procedures relating to applications must be followed in the normal way, and the hon. Gentleman can consider his application in due course.
 We should be wary about the wisdom of adding the word ''current'' to the issue of experience. It could exclude people with very recent experience of the lay advice sector. For example, an applicant might have built a vast depth of knowledge of the field over 20 or 30 years, but then left a month before applying to a particular position. If the amendment were accepted, such an applicant would have to be rejected and his knowledge would be lost. That is not the right approach as it is too restrictive. 
 In any case, we have not found references to ''current experience'' in other primary legislation. There would be issues in defining what is current experience. It is necessary to ensure that we have the flexibility to include very recent experience, although I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. 
 Amendment No. 79 has the further effect of increasing the number of lay advisers on the family procedure rule committee from one to two. The amendment is similar to another tabled in another place by Baroness Anelay of St. Johns. She recognised that 
''the family procedure rule committee has a narrower remit and is more specialised''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 February 2003; Vol. 644, c. 661.]
 and that perhaps the committee would need only one lay advice member. She consequently withdrew her amendment, and I advise the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to do the same. 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.